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A Glimpse into the Future of the Climate Regime: Lessons from the REDD+ 
Architecture  
 
Annalisa Savaresi* 
 
In 2015, parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) formally closed negotiations on measures to maintain and enhance the carbon 
storage capacity of forests in developing countries, commonly referred to as ‘REDD+’. This 
unusual and largely symbolic gesture seemingly signals that UNFCCC parties consider the 
international set of rules on REDD+ a ‘job done’, at least for the time being. This article 
reflects on the outcome of these negotiations and on the related law-making process, arguing 
that REDD+ may be regarded as the first ripe fruit in the pledge-and-review architecture 
recently enshrined in the Paris Agreement. REDD+ is therefore used in this article as a lens 
to understand how the new architecture for climate change governance may work, as well as 
challenges facing its implementation. In doing so, the article aims to shine a light on the path 
ahead for the Paris Agreement, making predictions on challenges likely to emerge with its 
implementation, the solutions that may be adopted, as well as areas where more international 
rules may be needed. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Paris Agreement1 adopted in December 2015 enshrines and perfects in treaty form the 
bottom-up ‘pledge-and-review’2 architecture that emerged since the ill-fated fifteenth 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change3 (UNFCCC) in 2009.4 This architecture relies on parties unilaterally declaring the 
action they intend to undertake to reduce their emissions, which is in turn to be subjected to a 
review process. In this context, the international climate change bureaucracy works as a 
notary collecting, and eventually enabling the review of the implementation of parties’ 
pledged action. This bottom-up architecture leaves a very wide margin of discretion to States 
on how to contribute to the endeavour of tackling climate change. As such, there is a stark 
contrast between this new architecture and the ‘targets-and-timetables’ one embedded in the 
Kyoto Protocol,5 which contemplates specific emissions targets for some parties, as well as 
timetables for their achievement, and a procedure to sanction lack of compliance. 
 
                                                 
* Corresponding author. 
Email: Annalisa.Savaresi@ed.ac.uk 
1 Paris Agreement, (Paris, 12 December 2015; not yet in force). 
2 The conceptualization of a pledge-and-review approach to climate governance is operated in the work of 
Daniel Bodansky; see: D. Bodansky, ‘The Emerging Climate Change Regime’ 20 Annual Review of Energy and 
the Environment (1995), 425; D. Bodansky and E. Diringer, ‘Towards and Integrated Multi-Track Climate 
Framework’ (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2007); D. Bodansky and E. Diringer, ‘The Evolution of 
Multilateral Regimes: Implications for Climate Change’ (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2010); D. 
Bodansky, ‘A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime’, in: H. Koch et 
al. (eds.), Climate Change and Environmental Hazards Related to Shipping: An International Legal Framework 
(Brill, 2012), 35; and D. Bodansky, ‘The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement’ (Centre 
for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012). 
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May 1992; in force 21 March 1994) 
(‘UNFCCC’). 
4 UNFCCC, Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord, (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 March 2010). 
5 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto, 11 December 1997, 
in force 16 February 2005) (‘Kyoto Protocol’). 
  
While the adoption of a new approach to international climate governance was a matter of 
necessity, given the toppling of the approach embedded in the Kyoto Protocol,6 the recent 
adoption of the Paris Agreement calls for a reflection on the challenges that may be 
encountered in operationalizing a bottom-up pledge-and-review architecture. In this 
connection, there is no need to look much further afield. Between 2005 and 2015, UNFCCC 
parties have built a bottom-up, pledge-and-review architecture to address emissions from the 
forest sector in developing countries,7 commonly referred to with the acronym ‘REDD+’. 
 
The REDD+ architecture aims to enable developing countries to reduce forest emissions (by 
cutting down deforestation, forest degradation and sustainable forest management) and 
increase forest carbon sequestration (through afforestation and reforestation) on a voluntary 
basis.8 According to its early proponents, REDD+ was expected to draw ‘developing country 
Parties towards emission reductions’, by means of an ‘equitable expansion of the market 
systems initiated following the Kyoto Protocol’.9 More specifically, the REDD+ architecture 
was expected to establish an international system enabling developing countries to reduce 
emissions on a voluntary basis, with developed countries providing them with the finance to 
do so, while appropriating carbon offsets, against the backdrop of the targets and timetables 
embedded in the Kyoto Protocol.10 The rationale was to reduce emissions in what seemed at 
the time a relatively cheap, fast and cost-effective way, in a sector that required little 
technology and finance, in a relatively small group of countries.11 However, ten years of 
negotiations have delivered an architecture that markedly differs from that envisioned by its 
early proponents,12 and is not linked to the targets-and-timetables architecture embedded in 
the Kyoto Protocol. Still, this unprecedented international environmental governance 
experiment has broken new ground on several counts.13 It has opened the way to reducing 
emissions in developing countries in a sector that has long caused much heartache to climate 
                                                 
6 As argued for example in D. Bodansky, ‘W[h]ither the Kyoto Protocol? Durban and Beyond’ (Harvard Project 
on Climate Agreements, 2011). 
7 The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates the share of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions from the agriculture, forestry and other land use sector at around 21%. 
IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in: O. Edenhofer et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate 
Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1, at 7. 
8 The acronym stands for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation in developing 
countries, and the scope of activities covered was progressively expanded to cover also the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (hence the 
‘+’). See UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 
2011), at paragraph 70. 
9 See Submission by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea, supported by Bolivia; Central African Republic; Chile; 
Congo; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Dominican Republic; and Nicaragua in: UNFCCC, Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries. Approaches to Stimulate Action: Submission from 
Parties. (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1, 11 November 2005), Annex, at 7-8. 
10 Kyoto Protocol, n. 5 above, Annex B. 
11 See for example N. Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), at 26. 
12 Negotiations on methodological guidance on REDD+ were formally closed in June 2015, see: UNFCCC, 
Methodological Guidance for Activities Relating to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation and the Role of Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests and Enhancement of Forest 
Carbon Stocks in Developing Countries. Draft Conclusions Proposed by the Chair (UN Doc. 
FCCC/SBSTA/2015/L.5, 9 June 2015). 
13 For a comprehensive review, see C. Voigt (ed.), Research Handbook on REDD+ and International Law 
(Edward Elgar, 2016). 
  
change scientists and policy makers alike.14 More importantly for the present purposes, 
REDD+ may be regarded as the first ripe fruit in the pledge-and-review architecture for 
international climate change governance. 
 
This article argues that experience accrued with the design and implementation of the 
REDD+ architecture holds important lessons for the Paris Agreement. It therefore uses 
REDD+ as a lens to understand how a pledge-and-review architecture to climate change 
governance may work, the challenges that may be encountered in its implementation, as well 
as the means that may be used to overcome these. The article opens by introducing the 
bottom-up pledge-and-review architecture for REDD+ and its relationship with the one 
sketched in the Paris Agreement. It then goes on to consider what the REDD+ experience 
reveals about the implementation of a bottom-up pledge-and-review architecture to climate 
change governance, and the challenges it poses. This exercise focuses on three elements: (i) 
the establishment of conditions for a market-based approach to climate change mitigation; (ii) 
the framework to review the implementation of parties’ obligations; (iii) and the management 
of the related international law-making process. The conclusions reflect on lessons that may 
be drawn from the design and the implementation of the REDD+ architecture for the long 
regulatory journey that parties to the climate regime are about to embark on to operationalize 
the Paris Agreement. 
 
BOTTOM-UP PLEDGE-AND-REVIEW ARCHITECTURES  
 
The Paris Agreement has brought to completion the pledge-and-review architecture that first 
emerged in 2009, by imposing an obligation on all parties to prepare, communicate and 
maintain successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and to pursue mitigation 
activities at the national level.15 This architecture hinges on obligations of conduct,16 which 
require all parties to submit information on how they intend to reduce their emissions, and by 
how much.17 While no format for (intended) NDCs18 could be agreed ahead of the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement, the conference of the parties serving as the meeting of the parties is 
expected to adopt specific guidance on this issue.19 The Paris Agreement furthermore 
establishes the premises for the creation of a machinery to review parties’ efforts 
                                                 
14 As explained, for example, in Z.E. Bailey, ‘Sink That Sank The Hague: A Comment on the Kyoto Protocol’, 
16:1 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal (2002), 103; and E. Trines, ‘History and Context of 
LULUCF in the Climate Regime’, in: C. Streck et al. (eds.), Climate Change and Forests. Emerging Policy and 
Market Opportunities (Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 33. The problematic nature of this sector is confirmed 
by the fact that the IPCC has prepared two special reports on land uses, one under preparation, and another 
published in 2000: see R.T. Watson et al. (eds.), Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry. A Special Report 
of the IPCC (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
15 Paris Agreement, n. 1 above, Articles 3 and 4.2. 
16 As argued also D. Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’, 25:2 Review of European, 
Comparative and International Environmental Law (2016); and A. Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement: A 
Rejoinder’, EJIL: Talk! (16 February 2016), found at: <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-paris-agreement-a-
rejoinder/>. 
17 Paris Agreement, n. 1 above, Article 4.2. 
18 UNFCCC Parties decided to submit intended nationally determined contributions (INDC) ahead of the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement, see UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.19, Further Advancing the Durban Platform 
(UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add. 1, 31 January 2014), at 2. 
19 Paris Agreement, n. 1 above, Article 4.13; and UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement 
(UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10, Add.1, 29 January 2016), at paragraph 31. 
  
periodically, both at the individual20 and at the aggregate level.21 Implementation of the 
agreement will also be assisted by an expert-based, facilitative compliance mechanism.22 
 
It is already abundantly clear that the obligations of conduct that make up the pledge-and-
review architecture of the Paris Agreement are rather different in nature from the obligations 
of result enshrined in the emissions targets for developed countries under the Kyoto 
Protocol.23 These targets are assisted by a rich set of obligations of conduct concerning the 
reporting of information, with the aim to enable the review of implementation and 
compliance. While the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol has delivered disappointing 
results, these are largely related to its approach to differentiation and to parties’ faltering 
political will,24 rather than to the targets-and-timetables architecture ex se. If anything, the 
Kyoto Protocol’s architecture for the review of implementation and compliance is rather 
robust, especially by the standards of an international environmental agreement.25 
 
It remains to be seen whether the new pledge-and-review approach to international climate 
change governance enshrined in the Paris Agreement will deliver the hoped for results and 
will be sustained by parties’ political will over time.26 The details of this architecture are yet 
to be designed by the body entrusted to prepare for the entry into force of the Paris 
Agreement and by the UNFCCC subsidiary bodies, in what can be expected to be a lengthy 
regulatory process.27 
 
REDD+ may be regarded as the first ripe fruit of this new architecture. UNFCCC developing 
country parties are merely encouraged, and not obliged, to undertake REDD+ activities.28 
However, if they decide to do so, they are required to comply with a set of obligations of 
conduct concerning the reporting of information, which are subjected to a review process.29 If 
they intend to seek results-based payments, they are furthermore subjected to an additional 
                                                 
20 Paris Agreement, n. 1 above, Article 13. 
21 Ibid., Article 14. 
22 Ibid., Article 15. See also C. Voigt, ‘The Compliance and Implementation Mechanism of the Paris 
Agreement’, 25:2 Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law (2016). 
23 Kyoto Protocol, n. 5 above, Article 3.1 and Annex B. For a reflection on the differences between these 
obligations, see: R. Wolfrum, ‘Obligation of Result Versus Obligation of Conduct: Some Thoughts About the 
Implementation of International Obligations’, in: M.H. Arsanjani and J. Cogan (eds.), Looking to the Future: 
Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 363; and P. Dupuy, 
‘Reviewing the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago’s Classification of Obligations of Means and Obligations 
of Result in Relation to State Responsibility’, 10:2 European Journal of International Law (1999), 371. 
24 As pointed out also in L. Rajamani, ‘From Berlin to Bali and beyond: Killing Kyoto Softly 57:4 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly (2008), 909; and D. Bodansky, n. 6 above. 
25 As argued for example also in R. Lefeber and S. Oberthür, ‘Key Features of the Kyoto Protocol’s Compliance 
System’, in: J. Brunnée et al. (eds.), Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 77; and M. Doelle, ‘Compliance and Enforcement in the Climate Change Regime’, in: 
E. Hollo et al. (eds.), Climate Change and the Law (Springer, 2012), 165. 
26 Some early reflections in this connection are provided in A. Savaresi and F. Sindico, ‘The Role of Law in a 
Bottom-up International Climate Governance Architecture: Early Reflections on the Paris Agreement’, 6 
Questions of International Law (2016), 1; H. van Asselt, ‘International Climate Change Law in a Bottom-up 
World’, 6 Questions of International Law (2016), 5; and C. Voigt, ‘The Paris Agreement: What Is the Standard 
of Conduct for Parties?’, 6 Questions of International Law (2016), 17. 
27 As detailed in Decision 1/CP.21, n. 19 above, at paragraphs 26, 28, 31, 34, 92-95 and 100-102 for the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Paris Agreement; and 29, 34, 37, 39-41, 58, 68, 76-77 and 101 for the Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice. 
28 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 8 above, at paragraph 71. 
29 Ibid., at paragraph 73. 
  
layer of reporting obligations and to an additional review process, which is geared to 
verifying the delivery of mitigation outcomes.30 
 
With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the nature of REDD+ has changed dramatically, 
from that of a means to merely enable developing countries to reduce emissions on a 
voluntary basis, to a means to enable them to comply with the pledges made in their NDCs. 
Yet there remains remarkable uncertainty on where the finance to carry out REDD+ may 
come from. In the mind of some of its early proponents, an international market-based 
architecture to support REDD+ was expected to emerge, creating conditions for investors to 
finance REDD+ activities, while ensuring the carbon integrity of emission reductions 
produced, as well as the cost-effective allocation of the resources available.31 Nevertheless, 
this architecture has not materialized. Instead, parties have recognized that REDD+ finance 
may come from a variety of sources,32 and, in practice, has so far been disbursed beyond 
market-based logics and the institutional remit of the UNFCCC. 
 
Even if, when compared with the stalemate that affected international climate change 
governance for many years, REDD+ negotiations represented an area of relative progress, the 
related law-making process has been far from straightforward, and may rather be likened to 
an odyssey.33 During this adventurous journey, the law on REDD+ has evolved in 
unpredicted directions, pulverizing into a myriad of uncoordinated arrangements, which may 
have become a hindrance to ensuring the comparability of parties’ efforts and their carbon 
integrity. 
 
There therefore seem to be three key areas where the experience with REDD+ may provide 
useful lessons for the implementation of the architecture sketched under the Paris Agreement. 
The first are the regulatory challenges associated with crafting an international legal 
framework for a market-based approach to climate change mitigation in the context of a 
bottom-up pledge-and-review architecture. The second relates to the design of obligations for 
the review of implementation of parties’ action. The third are challenges associated with the 
management of the law-making process itself. The following sections look at these three 
matters in turn, highlighting the challenges encountered in the construction and 
implementation of the REDD+ architecture and the lessons they may hold for the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. 
 
A MARKET BASED APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
 
Ever since the dawn of international climate change governance, States have toyed with idea 
of adopting a market-based approach to facilitate the reduction of emissions and gather the 
                                                 
30 These are outlined in UNFCCC, Decision 13/CP.19, Guidelines and Procedures for the Technical Assessment 
of Submissions from Parties on Proposed Forest Reference Emission Levels and/or Forest Reference Levels 
(UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add. 1, 31 January 2014); and Decision 14/CP.19, Modalities for Measuring, 
Reporting and Verifying (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add. 1, 31 January 2014). 
31 As envisioned for example in J. Eliasch, Climate Change: Financing Global Forests. The Eliasch Review 
(Earthscan, 2008). 
32 See Decision 2/CP.17, n. 38 above, at paragraph 65. 
33 See A. Savaresi, ‘Forests and Climate Change: An International Law-Making Odyssey’, Presentation at the 
Workshop on Smart Mixes in Relation to Forest and Climate Change Governance, University of Amsterdam, 4-
5 February 2015. 
  
finance necessary to do so, through the involvement of private investors.34 For better or 
worse, emissions trading is the policy tool upon which they have decided to focus their 
attention. 
 
The top-down targets-and-timetables architecture for international climate change 
governance enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol relied on a market-based approach to climate 
change mitigation. While the Protocol did not prescribe the creation of a global carbon 
market, its overall architecture largely hinged on the idea that such a market would 
materialize, kick-starting the process for its realization, by encouraging the use of marked-
based approaches to stimulate climate change mitigation.35 The Kyoto Protocol did so by 
establishing the so-called flexibility mechanisms to help parties achieve their targets, 
consisting of international emission trading, as well as mechanisms to enable joint 
implementation between developed countries, and between developed and developing 
countries respectively.36 Much of the regulatory activity carried out under the Kyoto Protocol 
was aimed at enabling the operation of these mechanisms. This regulatory framework details 
the conditions for the creation of credits and their trading, as well as to ensure that traded 
units are equivalent in nature and value (fungibility), and the product of genuine and 
comparable emission reduction activities (carbon integrity). The related rules have been 
developed by subsidiary bodies established under the Kyoto Protocol, which have maintained 
overall control of the rule-making process, as well as of the functioning of the flexibility 
mechanisms. 
 
Like the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement leaves open the possibility for parties to reduce 
their emissions by means of joint implementation.37 Yet, drawing an international law 
framework for a market-based approach to climate change mitigation in the context of a 
bottom-up, pledge-and-review architecture seems to raise specific regulatory challenges. 
These challenges largely relate to the need to create the regulatory conditions for investors to 
finance emission reduction activities, to ensure the carbon integrity of emission reductions 
produced, as well as a cost-effective allocation of the resources available. 
 
These challenges are well exemplified by the REDD+ architecture. When compared with the 
flexibility mechanisms established under the Kyoto Protocol, the REDD+ architecture is 
rather fragmented and patchy. UNFCCC parties are free to engage in REDD+ activities, and 
to resort to market-based approaches to support them, if they so choose.38 Initially, REDD+ 
finance was largely expected to mainly derive from the creation of a new commodity, i.e. 
REDD+ forest carbon credits. These credits were to be purchased by developed countries 
seeking to meet their emission reduction obligations, as well as by non-State actors with 
emission reduction obligations under domestic and/or regional law. The adoption of a 
market-based approach to REDD+, however, would require international rules for creating a 
demand for REDD+ credits, as well rules on how such credits would be created, and the 
                                                 
34 As reported for example in D.M. Driesen, ‘Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the 
Climate Change Convention’, 26:1 Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review (1998), 1. 
35 As noted also in H. van Asselt, ‘The Design and Implementation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading’, in: 
C. Carlarne et al., The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), 
336. 
36 Kyoto Protocol, n. 5 above, Articles 6, 12 and 17. 
37 UNFCCC, n. 3 above, Article 6.2 and 6.4. 
38 See UNFCCC, Decision 2/CP.17, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term   
Cooperative Action under the Convention, (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.2, 11 December 2011), at 
paragraph 65. 
  
conditions for their tradability on a like-to-like basis across jurisdictions. Yet, at present, 
these rules simply do not exist. 
 
The only proxy for such rules are those established in the context of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol.39 The CDM enables actors in developing 
countries to carry out climate change mitigation projects on a voluntary basis, and to create 
emission reduction credits, that may be purchased by developed country parties to achieve 
compliance with their targets under the Kyoto Protocol. In this transaction, developed 
countries obtain offsets they can use to comply with their obligations, whereas developing 
countries indirectly receive finance, as well as technology and know-how. This win-win 
scenario was expected to lead to emission reductions, while enabling developed countries to 
comply with their targets under the Kyoto Protocol, as well as their obligations concerning 
the provision of assistance to developing ones.40 These expectations, however, have been 
largely frustrated. The CDM viability relied upon the widespread uptake of carbon markets as 
a climate policy tool, which has not materialized.41 The numerous challenges facing the 
operation of existing carbon markets have induced a collapse in the price of carbon, and, 
consequently, in the demand for offsets.42 The desirability of offsets from the perspective of 
carbon integrity has furthermore been increasingly questioned.43 Together these factors have 
greatly undermined the CDM, prompting a lively, albeit inconclusive, debate over its 
reform.44 
 
Whereas in the beginning UNFCCC parties contemplated the inclusion of REDD+ activities 
in the scope of the CDM45 – which already includes afforestation and reforestation activities46 
– they progressively set aside this option. Instead, they decided to address specific monitoring 
and verification challenges associated with the forest sector by adopting a ‘jurisdictional’ 
approach to REDD+. Pursuant to this approach, REDD+ activities are to be measured and 
reported at the national level, and are anchored to State obligations.47 When compared with 
the ‘project-based’ approach of the CDM,48 therefore, REDD+ is markedly different, as it is 
States, and not project developers, who are in charge of monitoring emission reductions and 
of securing that REDD+ activities are carried out in line with internationally agreed 
requirements. Equally, transactions associated with REDD+ results-based payments are 
largely a matter of inter-State relations, whose ultimate parties are State actors and/or 
                                                 
39 Kyoto Protocol, n. 5 above, Article 12. 
40 UNFCCC, n. 3 above, Article 4.3. 
41 See the dataset available at: <http://www.carbonpricingleadership.org/who/>. 
42 As reported for example in A. Kossoy et al., State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2015 (World Bank, 2015). 
43 See for example M. Gillenwater and S. Seres, The Clean Development Mechanism. A Review of the First 
International Offset Program (Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2011). 
44 High-Level Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, Climate Change, Carbon Markets and the CDM: A Call to 
Action (2012). 
45 Ibid., at 31. See also the collection of suggestions reviewed in C. Parker et al., The Little REDD+ Book: A 
Guide to Governmental and Non-Governmental Proposals for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (Global Canopy Programme, 2009). 
46 UNFCCC, Decision 16/CMP.1 Land use, Land-use Change and Forestry (UN Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, 30 March 2006) Annex, at 13. 
47 UNFCCC, Decision 2/CP.13, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches 
to Stimulate Action (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 2008), Annex, at paragraph 7. 
48 On the possibility of moving beyond a project-based approach in the context of the CDM, see High-Level 
Panel on the CDM Policy Dialogue, n. 44 above. 
  
institutions performing as intermediaries between them.49 In this scenario, should REDD+ 
activities generate any credits at all, UNFCCC parties providing finance and those providing 
forest carbon credits would enter into relationships akin to bilateral investment and 
characterized by a do ut des ethos. Still, UNFCCC rules say nothing on the possible transfer 
of REDD+ credits or offsets. This issue is entirely left to bilateral dealings either between 
parties, and/or between parties and institutions providing REDD+ finance. This arrangement 
raises some concerns over unit transfers and the risk of double counting. While for the time 
being this risk largely remains hypothetical, if a market-based approach to REDD+ is widely 
adopted, it would seem necessary for UNFCCC parties to consider the means to tackle these 
risks. 
 
One expedient forum to do so may be the new sustainable development mechanism 
established under the Paris Agreement.50 Little is presently known on how this new 
mechanism for the joint implementation of mitigation activities will work, other than the fact 
that joint implementation activities should ‘apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the 
avoidance of double counting’.51 It is possible that REDD+ is included among eligible 
activities under the sustainable development mechanism, and that rules concerning the 
tradability of credits are developed in that context. 
 
It is important to note, nevertheless, that some parties have expressed reservations on 
including REDD+ credits in carbon markets, fearing that their abundant availability would 
swamp already frail carbon markets.52 Some developing country parties furthermore resist the 
idea that emission reductions carried out in developing countries be credited to developed 
ones,53 whereas others object to the commodification of forest carbon altogether.54 While it 
remains to be seen whether these fundamental objections will continue to be made after the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement, for the time being, a non-market-based approach to REDD+ 
has prevailed. In this context, developed countries get nothing in return for financing 
emissions reductions in developing ones, other than compliance with their general obligations 
to assist them in tackling climate change.55 As a result, inter-State support for REDD+ 
activities is akin to development assistance.56 The contrast with the CDM ethos is manifest: 
while, at least in theory, the CDM generates revenue through the sale of credits on carbon 
markets, finance for REDD+ is the result of development assistance arrangements between 
                                                 
49 As argued also in A. Dibler et al., ‘Consolidated Guide to the REDD+ Rules Under the UNFCCC’ (Baker & 
McKenzie, 2014), at 42. 
50 Paris Agreement, n. 1 above, Article 6.4(c). 
51 Paris Agreement, n. 1 above, Article 6.2. 
52 See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities Communication of 17 October 2008 on Addressing the 
Challenges of Deforestation and Forest Degradation to Tackle Climate Change and Biodiversity Loss, 
COM(2008) 645, at 10. 
53 See, e.g., Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the 16th Basic Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change. 
Governments of Brazil, South Africa, India and China, Meeting in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil (15-16 September 
2013), found at: <https://www.environment.gov.za/mediarelease/16thbasic_ministerialmeeting_climatechange>. 
54 See, e.g., the submission by the Plurinational State of Bolivia in: Matters Relating to Methodological 
Guidance for Non-market Based Approaches, such as Joint Mitigation and Adaptation Approaches for the 
Integral and Sustainable Management of Forests (26 March 2014), found at: 
<http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/12_15_130452435512456801-
Bolivia_NMBA.pdf>. 
55 UNFCCC, n. 3 above, Article 4.3. 
56 On the ‘aid-ification’ of REDD+ see, e.g., A. Angelsen and D. McNeill, ‘The Evolution of REDD+’, in A. 
Angelsen et al. (eds.), Analysing REDD+: Challenges and Choices (Center for International Forestry Research, 
2012), 31, at 39. 
  
parties willing to carry out REDD+ activities and those State and non-State actors willing to 
support these. 
 
This ‘aid-ification’ of REDD+ was largely necessitated by events. Given that a global carbon 
market does not exist, and that the main carbon market in existence – the European Union 
emission trading system – does not allow the trading of REDD+-derived credits, there was no 
other option but for REDD+ finance to come from aid budgets. While this may have been an 
acceptable interim solution to build the conditions to carry out REDD+ activities, in the long 
run there is a need to ensure the involvement of the private sector to scale up REDD+ 
finance.57 The adoption of a market-based approach, and the inclusion of REDD+ credits in 
existing emission trading schemes, would seem to be the obvious solution. Yet, no 
international rules on how this may happen have been agreed, and presently there is little 
clarity on the source of result-based payments for REDD+ in the long run. 
 
In sum, the experience with REDD+ seems to suggest that, if parties decide to adopt a 
market-based approach to finance climate change mitigation endeavours, they need to 
establish a clear set of rules applicable to all parties from the outset. These rules should 
enable the tradability of credits across jurisdictions, and ensure the carbon integrity of 
emission reductions. The experience with REDD+ sets a limited precedent in this connection, 
and clearly demonstrates the challenges associated with a bottom-up regulatory framework 
that leaves these important details to the contracting between parties and/or institutions 
disbursing REDD+ payments. Parties’ obligations concerning the provision of information 
and the review of implementation and compliance play a pivotal role in this regard, as 
explained next. 
 
THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The provision of information is a crucial ingredient of international environmental 
agreements, both to ensure the monitoring of problems that parties seek to tackle – in the case 
of the climate regime, the emissions of greenhouse gases and their impacts – as well as to 
review parties’ adherence to the obligations they have undertaken.58 The mechanisms for the 
review of implementation and compliance tend to differ, depending on the nature of parties’ 
obligations. This is well exemplified by the climate regime. 
 
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol deploy different systems to review the implementation 
of parties’ obligations. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the reporting of information, and the 
process for the review of implementation of parties’ obligations, are geared towards 
ascertaining fulfilment of developed countries’ obligations of results – i.e. the emission 
reduction and limitation targets enshrined in Annex B of the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol’s 
Compliance Committee has performed an important role in overseeing parties’ adherence to 
reporting obligations.59 
 
Conversely, under the UNFCCC the reporting of information and its review are not aimed to 
assess compliance with obligations of result. Instead, UNFCCC parties are subjected to 
                                                 
57 As suggested, for example, in C. Streck and C. Parker, ‘Financing REDD+’, in: A. Angelsen et al., n. 56 
above, 111. 
58 See, e.g., D.G. Victor et al. (eds.), The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Commitments (MIT Press, 1998). 
59 As argued for example in R. Lefeber and S. Oberthür, n. 25 above; and M.Doelle, n. 25 above. 
  
facilitative processes to provide information on the implementation of their obligations, 
which do not attach consequences to instances of lack of compliance. Furthermore, 
developed and developing country parties’ reporting obligations remain differentiated in 
nature and kind, and so are the related review processes.60 While implementation of these 
arrangements has just begun, it has already evidenced some shortcomings.61 First, the lack of 
a standard template to report pledged mitigation action before 2020 has hindered comparison 
between parties’ efforts. Second, the review process does not provide means to ‘ratchet up’ 
ambition over time. Third, developing countries have struggled to comply with their 
increased reporting obligations,62 thus drawing attention to the need for dedicated assistance 
and capacity building. More generally, the reporting of information in a transparent and 
complete manner is predictably harder where no standard definitions and/or methods exist.63 
 
These shortcomings are exemplarily demonstrated by REDD+. Reporting obligations to 
ensure the carbon integrity of emission reductions and removals associated with REDD+ 
activities are additional to those under the UNFCCC. Still, compared with the rules on the 
reporting of emissions and removals under the Kyoto Protocol, the REDD+ framework is 
characterized by a ‘country-driven’ approach,64 hinging on rather loose reporting obligations, 
which leave a remarkable margin of discretion to parties.65 
 
First, and contrary to what happened under the Kyoto Protocol, no definition of forest, or 
forestry activities, has been adopted for the purposes of REDD+. Allowing parties to adopt 
definitions of their choosing,66 however, leaves the scope of REDD+ virtually undetermined, 
and potentially engenders considerable inconsistencies.67 This potentially opens the way to 
incongruities as to what REDD+ activities are, rendering the comparison between parties’ 
efforts rather difficult.68 To be sure, this potential exists also under the Kyoto Protocol, and 
has led to much debate on rules concerning the accounting of emissions from land uses.69 The 
                                                 
60 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 8 above, at paragraphs 44-46 and 63-64. 
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67 As argued for example in N. Sasaki and F.E. Putz, ‘Critical Need for New Definitions of “Forest” and “Forest 
Degradation” in Global Climate Change Agreements’, 2:5 Conservation Letters (2009), 226; and T. Pistorius et 
al., Greening REDD+ Challenges and Opportunities for Forest Biodiversity Conservation, (University of 
Freiburg, 2010). 
68 As argued also in A. Savaresi, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries under the 
UNFCCC: Caveats and Opportunities for Biodiversity’, 21 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 
(2011), 81. 
69 As reported in P. Iversen et al., ‘Understanding Land Use in the UNFCCC’ (Climate and Land Use Alliance 
2014), at 24-25. 
  
related carbon integrity concerns have induced some developed countries to exclude 
emissions from land uses from generating credits tradable under their emission trading 
schemes.70 
 
Second, the reporting of REDD+ activities hinges on the setting of forest reference emission 
levels, which are the benchmarks against which parties’ performance will be assessed, taking 
into account historical data and emissions parties reported in the past.71 The fact that up until 
recently developing country parties only had very limited reporting obligations, however, 
entails that many do not have much historical data on their forest emissions and removals.72 
There can therefore be a great deal of arbitrariness in a party’s choice of its forest reference 
emissions level, which will be particularly difficult to assess. A ‘facilitative, non-intrusive’ 
expert assessment process73 is meant to provide an opportunity to identify areas for technical 
improvement,74 but no consequences are attached to negative assessments. It is up to those 
disbursing REDD+ finance to make their own mind on the reliability of reference levels, 
based on the information emerging from assessments. This remarkable margin of discretion 
raises the question of how to reconcile a bottom-up approach to climate change governance 
with the need to ensure the carbon integrity of the results they deliver. 
 
Third, parties have considerable discretion to choose the modalities for the measuring, 
reporting and verification of REDD+ emission reductions and removals.75 This is in line with 
the voluntary nature of REDD+ activities and with developing countries’ limited obligations 
concerning climate change mitigation under the UNFCCC.76 Nevertheless, with the shift 
embedded in the Paris Agreement, whereby all parties are required to reduce their emissions 
and to report information on the details,77 this arrangement is likely to become inadequate. 
 
Finally, like any other mitigation action undertaken by developing countries under the 
UNFCCC, the implementation of REDD+ activities is to be subjected to a facilitative 
consultation process aimed at enhancing transparency and contributing to capacity building in 
developing country parties.78 This process is non-adversarial in nature and is not aimed at 
detecting compliance with State obligations. Rather, it is aimed at improving the 
understanding of parties’ mitigation activities and enhancing their reporting capacity. Again, 
                                                 
70 This has consistently been the case in the European Union, see: Extended Impact Assessment on the Directive 
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76 Whereas UNFCCC, n. 3 above, Article 4.1(b) in principle requires all parties to reduce their emissions, in 
practice this provision has been interpreted in the sense of imposing binding emission reduction obligations only 
on developed countries. 
77 Paris Agreement, n. 1 above, Article 4. 
78 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 8 above, at paragraphs 56-62 and Decision 14/CP.19, n. 30 above. 
  
under the Paris Agreement, the adequacy of this review process will have to be scrutinized 
and brought into line with the new arrangements for the review of implementation and 
compliance made under that treaty.79 On top of the consultation process above, parties 
seeking results-based payments for REDD+ need to comply with additional reporting 
obligations, which are subjected to a separate and dedicated technical review process.80 How 
this process will work in practice, however, remains to be seen.81 While the review process 
does not contemplate any consequences for lack of compliance, it would seem plausible to 
expect that these will result in ineligibility to receive REDD+ payments. 
 
Institutions entrusted with the handling of REDD+ finance are likely to play an important 
role in this regard. Even though formally these institutions are not part of the review process, 
in fact, they will make their funding decisions on the basis of it, de facto applying 
consequences to lack of or poor compliance with parties’ reporting obligations. Again, this 
architecture remains to be tested in practice. Still, it already seems clear that the bulk of 
finance for REDD+ is likely to be disbursed beyond the institutional remit of the climate 
regime.82 As a result of this arrangement, crucial inter-State cooperation decisions are likely 
to be made beyond the institutional remit and scrutiny of the climate regime. While this is not 
ex se a tragedy,83 the long-term implications of this approach for the overall carbon integrity 
of climate change action remain to be seen. 
 
To sum up, the legal framework for the review of the implementation of parties’ obligations 
in relation to REDD+ remains sketchy, and largely untested in practice. The nature of parties’ 
obligations on REDD+ is yet to be understood, though it seems clear that at least some 
elements of this architecture have progressively hardened in obligations that now encumber 
parties wishing to seek results-based payments for REDD+ activities. Yet, under the Paris 
Agreement, specific carbon integrity considerations are associated with verifying that 
countries undertaking REDD+ activities actually reduce their emissions in line with their 
NDCs, regardless of whether or not they ask to receive results-based payments. Whether the 
rules and processes for the review of the implementation of REDD+ activities are suited to 
deliver this certainty seems doubtful. This in turn raises questions over the desirability of 
creating tradable credits associated with activities whose carbon integrity may be 
questionable. 
 
The Paris Agreement provides no explicit solutions to these questions. In its sole reference to 
REDD+, the agreement conveys parties’ lack of appetite to re-engage in law-making on the 
issue, and to reconsider what already agreed, in spite of its perceived shortcomings.84 Still, 
implementation of the Paris Agreement is expected to establish a level playing field, whereby 
all parties will report their emission reductions on equal terms and will be subjected to the 
same review processes.85 This guidance may also include specific new rules concerning 
emissions from the land sector. The history of existing rules suggests that devising a unitary 
format to measure, report and verify emissions in this sector is likely to be hard and time-
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81 The reports are available at: <http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-
annex_i_natcom/reporting_on_climate_change/items/8722.php>. 
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consuming.86 Experience accumulated with REDD+ thus far, however, indicates that also a 
country-driven approach to the measuring, reporting and verification presents challenges. 
 
Implementation of the Paris Agreement is furthermore expected to deliver a unitary system to 
review implementation and compliance, building upon the extant framework established 
under the UNFCCC.87 Even though in the short- to medium-term some differentiation is 
likely to remain, it would seem vital that over time all parties move towards a robust 
framework for reporting and reviewing the implementation of their obligations, along lines 
similar to those designed under the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Building upon the rules in the Kyoto Protocol would have two main advantages. First, it 
would secure that parties capitalize on experience accumulated with the implementation of 
extant rules and review processes, adjusting them to the specific regulatory needs arising 
under the Paris Agreement. Second, it would cater for the needs of parties wishing to avail 
themselves of market-based approaches to climate change mitigation, thus enabling 
tradability of credits across jurisdictions. Lastly, the experience with REDD+ signals that it 
would be ill-advised to leave the definition of the fundamental traits of the architecture for 
the reporting of information and the review of implementation to the free contracting between 
parties. There are, in other words, strong arguments to safeguard intergovernmental control 
over the law-making process, as the next section explains. 
 
THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 
 
International environmental law-making is characterized by ‘autonomous institutional 
arrangements’, with treaty bodies playing a fundamental role in development and 
interpretation of the law.88 Even by these standards, the ten years long regulatory odyssey 
that characterized the making of REDD+ features peculiarities that may hold important 
lessons for secondary rule-making under the Paris Agreement. 
 
While in 2009 the Copenhagen Accord emphatically called for the ‘immediate establishment’ 
of a REDD+ mechanism,89 this statement of intention was never acted upon. UNFCCC 
parties were unable to agree on the establishment of an institution in charge to ensure 
coherence and coordination in the delivery of financial and technical support for REDD+.90 
As a result, REDD+ has evolved without any overall institutional oversight. 
 
Again, a comparison with the CDM architecture is revealing. The Kyoto Protocol specifically 
entrusted the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Protocol to develop the rules 
on the functioning of the CDM,91 initiating sizeable institution-building and secondary rule-
making processes concerning the governance of the CDM, including rules on the creation of 
carbon credits.  Nothing of the kind has happened in relation to REDD+. 
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Instead, the REDD+ architecture is enshrined in COP decisions, which largely convey the 
idea of soft guidance and only rarely assume the connotation of legally binding 
requirements.92 This guidance has been complemented and supplemented by law-making 
activities and standard-setting activities carried out outside the scope of the climate regime, 
involving international agencies93 established beyond its institutional remit, and voluntary 
certification initiatives by non-State actors. This array of instruments is relevant because of 
the normative consequences that States and intergovernmental organizations attach to them.94 
As a result, State and non-State actors operating beyond the UNFCCC, and with no formal 
relation to it, have progressively filled in the governance vacuum on REDD+. 
 
As far as State action is concerned, numerous developing countries have undertaken to create 
the conditions to perform REDD+ activities, by adhering to bilateral and multilateral 
initiatives. So while no results-based payments have been made, a myriad of arrangements to 
create the enabling conditions for REDD+ activities exist. According to an unofficial 
compilation, at the time of writing a total of 1,294 REDD+ arrangements have been 
stipulated, including both inter-State agreements, as well as agreements between States and 
international organizations.95 
 
At the bilateral level, some developed and developing country parties to the UNFCCC have 
concluded agreements concerning the provision of finance for REDD+. These arrangements 
have taken disparate forms. Norway, for example, has undertaken a ‘payment-for-
performance’ approach, thereby the size of donations is commensurate to partner countries’ 
success in reducing emissions from deforestation.96 Other bilateral initiatives – such as those 
of Germany,97 and the United States98 – have not done so.99 These bilateral arrangements 
have engendered a legal landscape that is highly fragmented, both in form and in 
substance,100 and characterized by reliance upon aid to support REDD+ activities.101 
 
At the multilateral level, two international agencies have dominated the law-making process 
on REDD+: the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD);102 and the World Bank’s Forest Carbon 
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Partnership Facility (FCPF).103 These international agencies have entered into agreements 
with a large number of UNFCCC parties willing to undertake REDD+ activities, adopting 
standards interpreting and filling with more precise content the rules and guidance adopted by 
the UNFCCC COP. In doing so, these agencies have worked as de facto alternative law-
making forums.104 Although the FCPF and the UN-REDD standards are mere internal rules, 
their incorporation into partnerships and borrowing agreements makes them a crucial source 
of legal obligations for partner countries and a determinant factor in the emerging body of 
law on REDD+.105 These standards have become a main source of internationally coordinated 
guidance for UNFCCC parties that have partnered up with either the FCPF or the UN-REDD, 
or both.106 And while finance provided by means of the UN-REDD partnership agreements is 
akin to official development assistance, the FCPF explicitly requires the transfer of titles for 
emission reduction credits.107 More generally, divergence in standards by the FCPF and the 
UN-REDD has resulted in the fact that the same activities in the same countries may be 
subjected to different standards, depending on which institution is handling the funding. This 
chasm in the approach to REDD+ is hardly conducive to the establishment of a level playing 
field enabling countries to carry out REDD+ activities on an equal footing.108 
 
Finally, non-State actors have also contributed to the composite legal landscape on REDD+ 
by elaborating standards for the voluntary certification of REDD+ activities.109 International 
as well as local nongovernmental organizations have actively developed, implemented and 
invested in REDD+ demonstration projects.110 Even though these endeavours have been 
seemingly undercut by the adoption of a jurisdictional approach to REDD+,111 for the time 
being some finance to facilitate the involvement of non-State actors in REDD+ activities has 
been made available.112 
 
This diverse set of actors has given life to a range of separate and only intermittently 
communicating formal and informal law-making processes, which have produced 
multifarious legal outcomes. This proliferation of law-making endeavours has been 
necessitated by events and does not seem to augur well for the overall coherence of REDD+. 
Indeed, studies on the implementation of REDD+ have evidenced concerns over this state of 
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affairs.113 Rather than the outcome of a ‘smart design’, this heterogeneous collection of 
processes and outcomes is the result of what may be regarded as a renunciation of law-
making authority by the UNFCCC parties. Other forums have consequently attempted to 
address the various regulatory needs engendered by REDD+. Whereas this may have been an 
acceptable interim solution, it has progressively engendered a great deal of confusion and 
uncertainty. With no overall institution in charge, the bottom-up architecture on REDD+ 
seems to be in need for at least some orchestration to ensure the carbon integrity of REDD+ 
activities, the comparability between the results they deliver, as well as the most efficient use 
of the finite resources available to carry out REDD+ activities.114 
 
The Paris Agreement has not significantly altered this state of affairs, but merely recognizes 
ex post facto the rules adopted by the UNFCCC COP,115 without creating a dedicated 
institution in charge of overseeing REDD+ activities, and/or the related law-making process. 
Experience with REDD+ therefore seems to point to the need to carefully steer the law-
making process to realize the bottom-up pledge and review architecture envisioned in the 
Paris Agreement. Like that for REDD+, the Paris Agreement architecture was sketched with 
no smart design in mind, and under the pressure of largely dysfunctional negotiation 
dynamics. The secondary rule-making season awaiting the parties to the Paris Agreement 
provides an opportunity to build the elements of this new architecture rationally, learning 
from lessons accrued, amongst others, with REDD+. Some further reflections in this 
connection are provided in the conclusions. 
 
CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FROM THE REDD+ ODYSSEY 
 
This article has reflected on the bottom-up pledge-and-review architecture that characterizes 
REDD+, using it as a point of reference to predict challenges likely to emerge in the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement. The REDD+ architecture remains little tested in 
practice. The related legal landscape is characterized by a great deal of regulatory and 
institutional fragmentation, as well as uncertainty. Fundamental elements of this architecture 
remain undefined, most saliently those to enable a market-based approach to finance REDD+ 
activities; the review of implementation of parties’ obligations; and the coordination of the 
law-making process. 
 
The analysis carried out in this article has evidenced the need to strengthen existing rules to 
ensure the carbon integrity of REDD+ emission reductions and removals, and the review of 
implementation of parties’ action in a way that is in line with the transparency framework to 
be drawn up under the Paris Agreement. This is especially necessary if a market-based 
approach to REDD+ finance is adopted, which would in turn require the establishment of 
conditions to ensure the tradability and fungibility of REDD+ credits. 
 
This article has argued that, compared with those under the Kyoto Protocol, transparency and 
review arrangements concerning REDD+ are rather patchy. The comparatively more rigorous 
arrangements under the Kyoto Protocol seem better suited to ensure the carbon integrity of 
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mitigation activities. In an ideal world, it would seem logical for the parties to Paris 
Agreement to build upon rules developed under the Kyoto Protocol, rather than the looser 
facilitative review processes and the limited reporting obligations elaborated under the 
UNFCCC. If anything, rules and review processes under the Kyoto Protocol ought to be 
scaled up to apply to all parties, after having been reformed to address shortcomings that 
have become apparent in their implementation. Whether parties to the Paris Agreement will 
have the political will necessary to build such a robust framework, however, remains to be 
seen. 
 
Finally, experience with REDD+ seems to hold important lessons for the international law-
making process associated with the implementation of the Paris Agreement. It seems vital 
that parties to the Paris Agreement maintain in control of the making of rules on matters for 
which intergovernmental coordination is required. One such area is the reporting of 
information concerning emissions and removals, which needs to align with rigorous and 
homogenous rules and review procedures applicable to all, in order to ensure the carbon 
integrity of the climate regime. Another area where some coordination seems indispensable is 
the establishment of a regulatory framework to enable a market-based approach to climate 
change mitigation. Experience with extant carbon markets has revealed concerns over double 
counting and leakage. The secondary rules adopted under the Paris Agreement should tackle 
these risks head-on, establishing common parameters to ensure the integrity of emission 
trading. In this process, parties should resolutely resort to Ockham’s razor to tackle the 
institutional proliferation that plagues the climate regime, discarding processes and 
institutions that are no longer needed. The history of international climate change law-making 
thus far indicates that crafting these rules is unlikely to be easy or quick. The adoption of the 
Paris Agreement is but the beginning of a new, predictably lengthy regulatory odyssey. 
Parties to the Paris Agreement are not without maps and charts to navigate the predictably 
choppy waters expecting them. The experience they have accrued in years of negotiations on 
REDD+ will hopefully serve them as a guide in this new, exciting and perilous journey. 
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